康德的“先验”与“超验”之辨  

Discrimination on Transzendental and Transzendent in Kant's philosophy

作　　者：邓晓芒[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《同济大学学报（社会科学版）》2005年第5期1-12,共12页Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：武汉大学哲学学院中国传统文化研究中心资助。

摘　　要：本文对康德哲学中的“先验的”(transzendental)和“超验的”(transzendent)这两个历来颇有争议的术语进行了全面的清理,并结合相关概念如“先天的”(apriori)、“经验的”(empirisch)、“内在的”(immanent)等术语作了细致的区分,说明康德使用这几个词并不是随意的,而是有严格限定的、不可取代的含义的,以为康德对这些词的使用存在“混乱”的看法是站不住脚的。文章后面还对KempSmith以及牟宗三在这个问题上对康德的误解和批评进行了逐条反驳,维护了康德思想的一贯性和严密性。This article has sorted out two long-disputed terms-transzendental and transzendent in Kant＇s philosophy, and clarifies them carefully combined with some related concepts such as “a priori”, “empirisch” or “immanent” ,which illustrate that Kant is not disputing such words but they have strictly restricted and unchangeable meaning, and the assumption that his using of such words was in chaos is unstable. At the end of the article it refutes piece by piece the misunderstanding and criticisms of Kemp Smith and Mou Zong-san on these three items, defending the coherence and closeness of Kant＇s theory.

关 键 词：先验的 超验的 先天的 内在的 斯密 牟宗三 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]