Bertrand竞争下异质产品企业委托授权与横向兼并效应分析  

Delegation and Horizontal Mergers in a Differentiated Bertrand Oligopoly

作　　者：钟德强[1] 仲伟俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2005年第10期1-10,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70171025);湖南省自然科学基金(02JJY5017)

摘　　要：利用二阶段博弈模型,针对异质产品寡头Bertrand竞争市场,首先分析了委托授权对企业利润与行业竞争程度的影响,证明委托授权使行业内竞争度减弱,并使企业利润、价格上升.然后研究了委托授权下企业的兼并效应,证明当企业集中委托授权时,企业具有较大的兼并动力;特别是当产品替代性程度很大时,企业兼并动力比无委托授权时更大.最后讨论了兼并后各企业的经营者激励机制调整问题,证明兼并企业采用的激励机制与未兼并企业所采用的激励机制有明显差异,当产品替代性程度较小时,兼并企业所采用的激励机制其攻击性减弱;当产品替代性程度较大时,兼并企业所采用的激励机制其攻击性增强;但未兼并企业所采用的激励机制其攻击性普遍减弱.First, in the context of a Bern＇and oligopoly with differentiated products, using a two-stage game model, the paper studies the drivers of the use of strategic delegation and their impact on finns＇ profit and the degree of industry competition, we show that the market results are less competitive under a strategic delegation regime than under a non-delegation regime, and the price and the profit levels are higher under the strategic delegation regime than under the non-delegation regime. Then, the paper studies merger effects under strategic delegation, we show that the finns have enormous incentive for merger under centralized delegation. In particular, when the degree of product substitution is higher, the incentive for merger will be stronger under the strategic delegation regime than under the non-delegation regime. Finally, we discusses the adjustments of finns＇ managerial incentives after merger, and show that the selections of incentive scheme have substantially difference between the merger finn and non-merger finns. More precisely, after the merger process, the merger finn provides a more （less） aggressively incentive scheme to its managers when degree of product substitution is higher（smaller）, but other non-merger finns always give a less aggressively incentive scheme to its managers.

关 键 词：横向兼并 委托授权 异质产品 Bertrand寡头竞争 经营者激励 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]