委托—代理下人力资源有效激励模式与退出机制设计  

Mechanism Design of Incentive Pattern and Efficient Layoff for Human Resource under the Principal-Agent

作　　者：雷勇[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第1期46-49,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20020611009)

摘　　要：在假定产出可以观测的条件下,首先比较员工素质信息是完全信息和非对称信息下不同产出差异,再讨论基于利润分享激励模式下不同激励效应,最后设计出根据员工自愿选择策略而实现的企业存优弃劣的有效退出机制。Under the condition of the output of employees being measured, the differences of the output of employees with different abilities have been compared initially in complete information or in asymmetry information. Then the different incentive effects based on the mode of share in profit have been discussed. Finally, the efficient layoff mechanisms were also showed for employees with low abilities according to themselves selections.

关 键 词：利润分享 雇佣合同 机制设计 

分 类 号：C961[经济管理—人力资源管理]