报酬契约与内生性会计行为异化  

Compensation Contract and Intrinsic Alienation of Accounting Behavior

作　　者：陈若华[1] 刘慧龙[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南铁道职业技术学院,湖南长沙412001 [2]湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙410007

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2006年第2期73-79,共7页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70372037)

摘　　要：设计报酬契约以激发代理人的合意行为是公司治理的重要内容，而董事会及其相关的制度安排是报酬契约健康运行的关键。以我国2001年-2003年受到证监会公开谴责的上市公司为代表进行实证分析，结果表明：由于所有权的缺位和激励方式的单一，上市公司因会计行为异化而受公开谴责仅与上市公司的巨亏行为以及资产负债率正相关，而与报酬契约、董事会制度安排等的相关性则没有通过显著性检验。报酬契约与公司会计行为的不相关性以及控制权收益的隐性，成为我国上市公司会计行为异化泛滥的重要原因。To design an effective incentive compensation contract so as to stimnlate the agent＇s proper behavior is the major content of corporate governance, while the board and the arrangement of relevant institution is the key to the healthy work of compensation contract. An empirical analysis on the listed companies condemned publicly by the Stock Supervisory Committee shows： for lack of ownership and monotony of incentives, the listed companies condemned publicly for accounting behavior alienation is positively relative to their great loss and asset debt rate, while compensation contact and beard system arrangement do not have remarkable correlation. That compensation contract does not relate to accounting behavior and the hidden nature of control right becomes the important cause of the alienation of accounting behavior in our country.

关 键 词：报酬契约 公司治理 会计行为异化 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]