所有者结构与封闭式基金折价  

Ownership Structure and Closed-End Fund Discounts

作　　者：谷伟[1] 余颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《数理统计与管理》2006年第3期297-305,共9页Journal of Applied Statistics and Management

摘　　要：委托代理理论认为所有者结构将对公司价值存在影响,分别为兴趣趋同效应和大股东侵占效应。这两种效应分别预言:大股东持股比例上升将增加/损害公司价值。在西方和中国股市的实证研究同时发现了这两种效应的存在。同时有理认认为:在美国的封闭式基金之间也存在大股东侵占效应,基金大股东持股越高,封闭式基金折价幅度越高。本文针对中国封闭式基金的理论和实证研究发现:在中国,横截面回归分析结果表明:当封闭式基金大股东持股比例越高,基金折价幅度越大。本文作者进一步指出:这种与美国实证研究类似的结果不是由于大股东侵占引起的,而是由于机构投资者等大股东主动选择的结果:机构投资者倾向于投资于折价幅度比较高的封闭式基金。Agency-Proxy theory argues that ownership structure would influence the corporate value. There are two kinds of effects： convergence of interest effect and entrenchment effect. Convergence effect argues that when the block owner＇s holding rate increased corporate value increase too. Entrenchment effect argues that when the block owner＇s holding rate increased, corporate value would decrease. Both effects have been supported by researches. Some researchers also pointed out that the ownership structure would also influence closed-end fund＇s discount rate. Due to entrenchment effect, a negative relation would exist between fund premiums and the block owner＇s holding rate. Our research has found such a relationship existed in Chinese stock markets. However, an alternative explain has been provided instead of entrenchment effect.

关 键 词：所有者结构 委托代理理论 封闭式基金折价 中国股市 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]