掏空、合谋与独立董事报酬  

Tunneling,Collusion and Independent Director Compensations

作　　者：董志强[1] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《世界经济》2006年第6期71-83,共13页The Journal of World Economy

摘　　要：本文建立了一个“全体股东/独立董事/大股东”三层代理模型,考察独立董事与试图掏空企业资产的大股东之间潜在的合谋对独立董事报酬合约的影响。基本结论是:大股东的掏空动机依赖于其实现控制企业的股权水平,越小的股权控制企业掏空动机越强烈;当独立董事合谋概率较小(比如有完善的独立董事市场激励和约束)或投资者法律保护水平较高的时候,可以对独立董事支付固定报酬;而独立董事合谋概率较大且法律对投资者保护水平较低的时候,为了尽可能维护全体股东的利益,就有必要对独立董事支付激励报酬。The paper has developed an “shareholders/independent director/controlling shareholder” three-tie agency model to analyze the affection of collusion between independent director and controlling shareholder who wants to tunnel company's assets on compensations contract of independent director.The basic conclusions are:The motivation of tunneling from controlling shareholder depend on the proportion of ownership with which the con- trolling stock holder realize the control of the firm,the less the proportion of ownership from controlling stock holder is,the stronger motivation of tunneling is;and the fixed compensation is more suitable to be paid to inde- pendent director if the collusion probability is little ( such as there is an effective independent director market) or the level of investor protection of the law is high;and the incentive compensation is more suitable when collu- sion probability is great and the investor protection is poor.

关 键 词：公司治理 独立董事报酬 大股东 

分 类 号：F272.72[经济管理—企业管理]