维特根斯坦关于分析判断与综合判断之间“第三种可能性”的思考  

Wittgenstein on "The Third Possibility" between Analytic Judgment and Synthetic Judgment

作　　者：徐英瑾[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学系,上海200433

出　　处：《复旦学报（社会科学版）》2006年第5期49-56,94,共9页Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

基　　金：2006年度国家社科基金项目"维特根斯坦哲学视野中的人工智能问题"(项目批准号:06CZX011)的资助

摘　　要：在维特根斯坦的思想发展历程中,在“分析判断”与“综合判断”之间再开辟出“第三种可能性”的想法曾在上世纪二三十年代之交与他对于其“现象学”观念的思虑纠缠在一起———比如根据他晚年的追溯,科学经验与逻辑之间的中介地带就曾被他描述为“现象学”。就坚持那些构成物理世界的先验法则在被给予范围内的可直观性而言,维氏的“现象学”其实是与胡塞尔的“现象学”颇有可沟通之处的———尽管他在维也纳学圈中的那些学友们更愿意将他视为一面反胡塞尔的旗帜。但他最后却发现,在“直观”这个狭隘的领域内去全面落实为构建整个物理世界所需的先验框架,未免显得过于贪心。这种发现最终导致了“直观”的地位在维氏后期哲学中的相对下降,以及他对于那种奠基于“直观”的“第三种可能性”的全面否弃。In the development of his philosophy, Wittegenstein＇s acknowledgement of ＂the third possibility＂ between analytic judgment and synthetic judgment was closely connected to his briefly held conception of ＂phenomenology＂, which was described as the ＂midway between empirical science and logic＂ in his later works. The possibility of this ＂phenomenology＂, according to him, lies in the very possibility of showing all of those transcendental laws constituting the physical world in the sphere of intuition. This idea, however, does demonstrate an amazing affinity with Husserlian doctrines, although members from Vienna Circle were more inclined to label Wittgenstein as an ＂anti-Husserl＂ thinker. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein gradually found it quite exaggerative to unfold the whole transcendental grammars underlying the physical world from the unique starting-point of intuition, the discovery of which eventually forced him to give up ＂the third possibility＂ based on intuition.

关 键 词：第三种可能性 现象学 直观 语法 色盲 

分 类 号：B521[哲学宗教—外国哲学]