公司治理效率与投资者保护:一个理论分析框架  

The Efficiency of Corporate Governance and Investor Protection: A Theoretical Analysis Frame

作　　者：罗本德[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第4期61-66,97,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：本文通过一个理论模型的分析框架,探讨了公司治理与投资者保护之间的内在联系。本文的研究结果表明,公司治理与投资者保护之间存在密切的联系。法律对投资者的保护越好,则股东经理转移公司利润的倾向越低,治理效率越高;在信息不对称情况下,所有上市公司都将选择治理效率最低的战略组合,这是目前我国上市公司治理效率普遍较低的原因之一;如果法律强制性地提高对投资者的保护,将使所有公司都能从中得到效率收益,从而使得所有公司的状况得到改善。Through a theoretical analysis frame, this article discusses the inner link between corporate governance and investor protection. This article＇s findings indicates the close relationship between the corporate governance and the investor protection. If the law can protect the investor better and better, the tendency of the shareholder manager shifting the company profit will be lower and lower, and the governance efficiency will grow higher and higher; In the asymmetrical information situation, all listed company will be ready to choose the lowest strategy association of the governance efficiency, this can indicate the reason of the generally low governing-efficiency of listed company in our country at present; on the other hand, if the law enhances the compulsory, protection of the investor, it will enable all companies obtain the efficiency income from it, which will improves the condition of all companies.

关 键 词：公司治理 效率 投资者保护 均衡 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]