寡头市场的激励机制与企业兼并  

Incentive Regime and Mergers in Oligopoly Market

作　　者：王为民[1] 张世英[2] 

机构地区：[1]河北建设集团有限公司,河北保定071070 [2]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第4期89-93,72,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：本文采用Sklivas的管理者报酬是利润和销售收入的线性合成形式,运用子博弈完美均衡博弈方法,分析了激励机制在寡头竞争市场上的作用,指出企业业主对其管理者运用激励机制,提高了企业的生产效率,加强了市场的竞争。管理者不仅要注重企业的利润,还要注重企业的市场占有率。另外,分析了激励机制对企业兼并前后的影响,指出了企业的发展战略目标。This paper analysis the incentive regime＇s effect on finns in oligopolistic markets with subgame perfect equilibrium method and points out that the finn owners can improve products efficiency and reinforce the markets competition, according to manager＇s recompense being a linear combination of profits and revenues in Sklivas＇s paper. Managers not only pay attention to maximize theirs profits, but also maximize theirs revenues-the product market share. In addition, it contrasts the effect on incentive regime in premerger and postmerger, indicating finn＇s development stratagem.

关 键 词：寡头市场 激励机制 子博弈完美均衡 企业兼并 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]