论罗蒂的知识确证观  

On Richard Rorty's View of Justification of Knowledge

作　　者：吴开明[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2007年第1期106-113,共8页Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(02BZX042)

摘　　要：知识的确证问题是西方知识论的核心问题。罗蒂认为知识的确证是一种社会现象。罗蒂的知识确证观,与他反思、比较两种不同的确证范式和思路紧密相关。罗蒂断定传统确证观混淆了知识主张的确证和因果性说明,而这种混淆之所以发生,就在于以视觉隐喻作为解决知识确证问题的预设。罗蒂认为,实用主义提出了一条可取代传统确证观的更合理的知识确证的新思路。这一思路把知识看作是经由主体间讨论或对话而被确证的真信念。罗蒂关于知识确证的主张,是摒弃传统确证观,推崇这种知识确证新思路的引申和结果。The justification of knowledge is the core problem of westem epistemology. Richard Rorty thinks that the justification of knowledge is a social phenomenon. His views of justification of knowledge conform to his rethinking of two different paradigms of justification. He regards that the views of traditional justification loses the justification of knowledge and the explanation of cause and consequence. The loss is the result of the presupposition to approach the problem with visual metaphor. Rorty thinks that pragmatism develops a new reasonable way. It can replace the view of traditional justification by viewing knowledge as truthful idea in discussing inter-subject, His ideas result from giving up the traditional view and developing a new way of justification.

关 键 词：罗蒂 知识论 确证观 

分 类 号：B712.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]