国有企业经营者的市场声誉模型研究  

Study on the Prestige-model of Manager Market in State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：陈柏福[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经贸学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2007年第2期103-108,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：针对国有企业经营者存在待遇偏低、内部争权夺利现象严重和内部约束机制软化等问题,通过引入自然状态变量来构造声誉模型,突出随机变量因素在评定和考核经营者绩效的作用,分析了声誉机制在完善国有企业经理人市场中的功能,并就相关分析提出具体建议。Managers in state owned enterprises are under conditions of earning low salary, fighting for power and receiving soft constraints. Through drawing into natural state variable to construct prestige model, we do emphasize the effect of random variable factor on manager achievement＇s evaluation and assess, and then analyze the function of prestige mechanism on consummating manager market in state owned enterprises. Finally we also put forward some definite suggestions with regard to the relevant analysis.

关 键 词：经理人市场 声誉模型 自然状态 稽查特派员 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]