考虑声誉效应的风险投资控制权激励机制  

Research on Control Right Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Based on Reputation

作　　者：徐晋[1] 王爱民[1] 陈宏民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第3期67-71,85,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172001)

摘　　要：声誉与控制权都是风险投资激励机制的重要组成因素,但对二者之间的互动关系还缺乏深入研究。为此通过建立数学模型,分别从股权、债权、可转换优先股三个方面,研究声誉效应对风险投资控制权激励机制的影响。分析表明,在考虑声誉的控制权激励机制下,风险企业家有建立高信誉的动机,其努力程度的提高幅度与能力贡献系数、努力贡献系数、折现率以及能力预期的方差正相关,与外界噪音的方差负相关;若风险企业家声誉提高,风险投资家可能会追加股权投资、增加债务投资,或通过降低可转换优先股转换比例等方式给予风险企业家更多的控制权,否则就可能削弱风险企业家的控制权。According to mathematical model, the effect of reputation on control-right incentive mechanism is studied in three aspects as stock, debt, and convertible security. Analysis shows that the venture entrepreneur has an incentive of building high reputation when reputation is consider in control-right incentive mechanism of venture capital investment. The improvement of effort has positive relationship with ability coefficient, effort coefficient, discount rate, and variance of ability, while has negative relationship with variance of noise. If the reputation of venture entrepreneur is improved, the venture capitalist would invest more as stock, debt, or lessen convert rate, otherwise the venture capitalist would decrease the control right of venture entrepreneur.

关 键 词：声誉 风险投资 控制权 激励机制 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理]