问责制度、产权变迁与国企改革:基于代理成本的分析  

Accountability System,Evolution of Property Right and Reform of SOEs:an Analysis Based on Agency Cost

作　　者：陈和[1] 杨舜贤[1] 隋广军[1] 王海洋 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632 [2]银河股份有限公司,北京100036

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2007年第5期1-8,共8页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：本文回顾了国内有关国企改革的争论,提出产权并不是制约国企发展的关键变量,同时实施竞争性环境、减轻政策性负担、硬化预算约束这些政策也无法真正提升国企绩效。笔者认为代理成本问题是阻碍国企发展的核心环节,并建立理论模型证明激励和监督机制是解决企业代理成本的有效机制。在解决国企非效率上,因为产权变迁的问责制度都可以建立有效的激励和监督机制,所以在代理成本这个环节实现了逻辑的统一,而非国内学者所争论的那样对立。最后基于全文的分析,笔者提出在不同特性的产业,产权变迁和问责制度具有各自的优势,是国企改革的两条不同路径。This article reviews the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in China.We propose that property right is not the key to SOEs development,and such policies as promoting competition,alleviating firm burden and enforcing budget would not be effective to better SOEs performance.We hold that agency cost is the core issue that constrains SOEs development,and put forward a theoretical model to demonstrate motivation and supervision as the effective mechanism to resolve the agency cost.As property right evolution and accountability system are to build effective motivation and supervision,thus the former two are the key to SOEs development.Finally,we propose that accountability system and property right evolution can be viewed as two different paths to SOEs reform because each of them is advantageous for specific sectors.

关 键 词：国企改革 代理成本 问责制度 产权变迁 激励机制 监督机制 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]