民营企业引入职业经理过程中的逆向选择问题  

On the Adverse Selection Problem during the Process through Which Private Enterprise Hires Professional Managers

作　　者：吉云[1] 张建琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2007年第9期12-29,共18页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"民营企业经理人进入障碍的实证分析与治理机制研究"(批准号:70372055);中山大学"985"工程产业与区域发展研究哲学与社会科学创新基地的资助

摘　　要：现有文献还没有对我国民营企业的家族化运作给出令人满意的经济学解释。本文应用逆向选择和动态匹配模型对民营企业引入职业经理的过程进行分析,尝试从经济学角度给出一个对家族制度的解释。分析表明,家族化是有关职业经理能力和忠诚度信息不对称的一个均衡,该均衡导致企业管理退化到"封闭"的家族模式。而雇主与经理人之间的互动信息揭露有助于改善这一均衡,一定程度上实现双方的"双赢"匹配。本文据此提出了一些对策建议。We haven＇t a satisfactory economic explanation for the prevalence of family enterprises in China to date. Using adverse selection and dynamic matching models to analyze the process through which the private enterprise hires professional managers, this article try to propose an explanation for phenomenon of family governance of the firm from the viewpoint of economies. We argue that the ＂closed＂ family governance is equilibrium resulted from informational asymmetries about the ability and loyalty of the professional manager between the boss and managers. The information discovering from the interaction between them can mend such situation, so that to some extent the matching beneficial to both may occur. On the basis of the before-mentioned analysis, we provide some useful suggestions.

关 键 词：家族企业 职业经理 逆向选择 匹配 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]