用人合同的委托代理问题及对策  

The Principal-agent Problem of the Employment Contract and the Countermeasures

作　　者：袁青川[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学商学院,新疆五家渠831300

出　　处：《科技情报开发与经济》2007年第10期216-217,共2页Sci-Tech Information Development & Economy

摘　　要：分析了由于合同的不完整性和不明确性以及合同双方的信息不对称性可能引发的“道德风险”的问题,提出了一些加强合同自我强化的措施。This paper analyzes on the problem of the ＂moral risk＂ probably caused by the imperfection and ambiguity of the contract and the asymmetric information of both sides of the contract, and advances some measures for strengthening the self-strengthening of the contract.

关 键 词：劳动合同 委托-代理问题 剩余分享 

分 类 号：F243[经济管理—劳动经济]