委托授权下企业横向兼并效应与激励机制研究  

On firms' horizontal merger effects and its influence on incentive mechanism under delegation

作　　者：钟德强[1] 仲伟俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2007年第6期1-12,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171025);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(05JJ40109)

摘　　要：针对异质产品Cournot寡头竞争市场,研究两种不同委托授权下企业的横向兼并效应与内部激励机制调整问题.首先证明了无论企业采用何种类型委托授权模式都具有较大的横向兼并动机,且产品替代性程度越低,兼并动力越大,只是在分散委托授权模式下企业的兼并动机比集中委托授权模式稍弱一些.并且证明兼并企业采用分散委托授权模式时与采用集中委托授权模式时其经营者激励机制调整有明显不同,集中委托授权模式所采用的经营者激励机制其攻击性普遍增强,而分散委托授权模式所采用的经营者激励机制其攻击性普遍减弱,但未兼并企业所采用的经营者激励机制其攻击性总是随兼并规模的增大而增加.In this paper, in the context of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we analyze merger effects under two strategic delegations, and the selection of internal incentive mechanisms before and after the merger. First, we show that the firms generally have incentive for merger under any strategic delegation. The incentive for merger will become stronger when the degree of product substitution is lower, and yet the incen- tive for merger under decentralized delegation is lower than that under centralized delegation. Furthermore, we show that the selection of incentive mechanism have substantially difference between decentralized delegation and centralized delegation after merger. More precisely, after the merger process, the merger firm under cen- tralized （decentralized） delegation provides a more （less） aggressive incentive scheme to its managers, and other non-merger firms always give a more aggressive incentive mechanism to its managers.

关 键 词：横向兼并 博弈 委托授权 Coumot竞争 经营者激励机制 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]