基于排污权交易的厂商污染治理新技术投资决策的期权博弈模型  

Study on the Option Game Model of New Technology Decision for Pollution Treatment Based on Emission Permits Trade

作　　者：李寿德[1] 黄采金[1] 顾孟迪[1] 张东红[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2007年第6期701-705,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573073);国家社会科学基金资助项目(03BJY040)

摘　　要：应用期权博弈理论建立了排污权交易条件下领导厂商与跟随厂商污染治理新技术投资决策模型,给出了领导厂商与跟随厂商污染治理新技术投资的期权价值和最佳时机,并进行了仿真计算。结果表明,通过排污权市场预期价格与期权价值临界值的比较,可以进行厂商污染治理新技术投资或者等待的决策。In the paper, we establish a model for new technology investment decision for pollution treatment of leading and following firms under emission permits trading mechanism. The option value and best time of the new technology investment for both leaders and followers are obtained, and the simulations are conducted. The results show that comparing the expected market price of emission permits with critical option value, firms can decide to invest for the new technology or just to wait.

关 键 词：污染治理新技术 实物期权 排污权交易 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]