股权激励、盈余操纵与国有股减持  

Equity Incentives,Earnings Manipulation and State-owned Shareholding Reduction

作　　者：陈千里[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第1期149-155,共7页Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号70571022)

摘　　要：该文基于一个代理模型从理论上分析盈余操纵和国有股减持对股权激励合约的影响。股权激励具有双重效应,既激励管理层努力工作以增加股东价值,也诱使其操纵盈余而耗费公司资源,最优股权激励计划需要降低激励强度以权衡此两种效应。在部分投资者低估盈余操纵程度的情况下,国有股减持会促使控股股东加大股权激励强度,盈余操纵程度相应上升。研究结果揭示,过高的股权激励不仅会带来内部人侵占国有资产、大股东损害中小股东的利益的后果,而且可能使抑制盈余操纵活动的市场监管措施失效,这为近期国资委和财政部联合发布国有控股上市公司的股权激励试行办法提供了理论解释。Based on an agent model,this paper analyzes the impact of earnings manipulation and state-owned shareholding reduction on equity incentive contracts.Equity incentives have double effects which not only prompt managers to exert productive effort,but also induce them to manipulate earnings.Optimal equity incentive contract must trade off these two effects.In the presence of investors who underestimate the earnings manipulation,more state-owned shareholding reduction raises the pay-for-performance sensitivity which induces more earnings manipulation.The results provide a theoretical explanation for the current national relevant policies.

关 键 词：股权激励 盈余操纵 国有股减持 代理模型 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]