谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响:角色的调节作用  

The Impact of the First Offer on Negotiation Impasse:Negotiating Roles Matter

作　　者：王敏[1] 张志学[1] 韩玉兰[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《心理学报》2008年第3期339-349,共11页Acta Psychologica Sinica

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金(编号20060400351);北京大学企业绩效管理研究中心"青年学者奖学金"资助项目

摘　　要：谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义。This paper aims to examine the impact of negotiators＇ first offers on negotiation impasse as well as the moderating effect of negotiating roles. Even though first offers can have significant effects on the process and outcome of negotiations, this topic has been largely overlooked in existing literature on negotiation impasse. Two studies were conducted to investigate the relationship between ftrst offers and negotiation impasse. In Study 1, we predicted that extreme first offers can lead to impasse in that such offers might narrow the possible negotiation zone and elicit competitive behaviors from the counterparts. Study 2 focuses on whether negotiating parties with different powers can moderate the relationship between the first offers and the negotiation impasse. Since negotiation situations are characterized by uncertainty and information asymmetry, the negotiating parties will rely on schema or heuristics to predict and judge their opponent＇s behaviors. For negotiators with less power, making an extreme offer could violate the schema or the other party＇s expectations toward them, and thus, the negotiating parties would be likely to feel dissatisfied and offended and finally quit negotiations. In contrast, powerful negotiators＇ extreme first offers are consistent with the schema possessed by negotiators, and high first offers are more likely to be accepted by the opposing parties, thus leading to agreements. We also propose that the powerful party＇s perception mediates the relationship between the weak party＇s first offer and the negotiation impasse. Study 1 used a two - party, single - issue, distributive negotiation simulation to investigate the effect of first offers. The exercise described a bonus negotiation between an MBA student in the job market （job candidate） and a personnel manager from a consulting company. Study 2 used a similar exercise, but the power discrepancy was manipulated with the personnel manager having more power than the candidate. Study 1 comprised 116 MBA student

关 键 词：第一次出价 谈判破裂 权力 图式 

分 类 号：B849[哲学宗教—应用心理学] C91[哲学宗教—心理学]