试论道德的关爱取向与公正取向  

Complementary or Negative——Considering the Relationship Between Moral-Orientation of Care and That of Justice

作　　者：倪伟[1] 方红[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学心理辅导中心,200444 [2]安徽人民出版社,230061

出　　处：《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》2008年第2期109-114,共6页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地南京师范大学道德教育研究所资助(DYS080201)

摘　　要：著名道德心理学家卡罗尔.吉利根在研究人类道德的发展时听到了一种不同的声音,提出了道德的关爱取向。虽然关爱道德取向与公正道德取向存在很大的差异,但她认为,关爱取向与公正取向之间是互补的,它们是一种平等对话的关系。而赫克曼从关爱取向和公正取向对"发展"、"自我"的理解以及各自所基于的认识论出发,对吉利根的观点作了另一种阐释:关爱取向是对公正取向的否定,它是一种根本的重新建构。公正取向与关爱取向之间的关系还有待于道德心理学研究者的进一步探索。When studying human morality development, Carol Gilligan, a well-known moral psychologist heard a different voice, so to put forth the theory of care orientation of justice. While much difference exists between orientation of care and that of justice, she argues that they are complementary and maintaining an equal dialogical relationship. With notions of development and self explained epistemologically and in the perspective of care orientation and that of justice, S.J. Hekman offers new insight into the understanding of Gilligan： With orientation of care being negative to that of justice, a thorough reconstruction is done. The relationship between orientation of care and that of justice is expecting to invite more studies.

关 键 词：关爱 公正 互补 否定 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]