异质产品Bertrand寡头竞争企业分散授权横向兼并效应分析  

Horizontal Mergers of Firms with Decentralized Delegation in Differentiated Bertrand Oligopoly

作　　者：刘莉[1] 钟德强[1] 刘辉[2] 罗定提[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096 [2]湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第2期41-46,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171025);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(02JJY5017)

摘　　要：针对异质产品寡头Bertrand竞争市场,建立了一个替代性产品企业分散授权横向兼并Bertrand竞争博弈模型,分析了企业采用分散授权横向兼并模式时的效应问题。证明企业具有较大的采用分散委托授权模式兼并动力,且产品替代性程度越高,兼并动力越大;但企业分散委托授权兼并模式兼并动力比集中委托授权兼并模式稍弱一些。讨论了企业采用分散授权兼并模式时,兼并后各企业的内部激励机制调整问题,证明兼并企业采用的激励机制与未兼并企业所采用的激励机制有明显差异,兼并企业所采用的激励机制其攻击性显著减弱,而未兼并企业所采用的激励机制其攻击性仅略有减弱。In this paper,we establish a game model of horizontal mergers under Bertrand competition in an oligopoly industry with substitute products, and analyze horizontal merger effects of firms when merger firms adopt decentralized delegation. We show that the firms have stronger incentive for merger under decentralized delegation, the incentive for merger will become stronger when the degree of product substitution is higher, and yet the incentive for merger under decentralized delegation is lower than that under centralized delegation. Furthermore, we discuss the adjustment of incentive mechanism of these firms after merger under decentralized delegation. We show that the incentive mechanisms have substantially differ- ence between merger firms and non-merger firms after merger process. More precisely ,after the merger process, the merger firm provides a much less aggressively incentive mechanism to its managers, but other non-merger firms give a slight less aggressively incentive mechanism to its managers.

关 键 词：横向兼并 分散授权 BERTRAND竞争 激励机制 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]