公司治理、盈余质量与经理报酬研究——来自中国上市公司数据的检验  被引量:33

Study on Corporate Governance,Earnings Quality,and Top Executive Compensations

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作  者:朱星文[1] 蔡吉甫[1] 谢盛纹[1] 

机构地区:[1]江西财经大学会计学院

出  处:《南开管理评论》2008年第2期28-33,68,共7页Nankai Business Review

基  金:江西财经大学校级创新团队"公司治理与会计治理"创新团队和校级青年课题资助

摘  要:本文从经理报酬契约设计的一般原理出发,系统论证了经理报酬、盈余管理和董事会三者之间的关系。在此基础上,运用我国上市公司2004年度的数据,对经理报酬业绩敏感度与盈余管理、董事会的关系进行了研究。研究发现,盈余管理对经理报酬业绩敏感度具有显著的正向影响,表明当经理报酬契约基于会计业绩设计时,经理有动机为增加其报酬利用盈余管理调增了会计收益。同时,研究结果还表明,尽管董事会对经理的选聘、报酬契约的合理确定和会计业绩的真实性负有重要职责,然而董事会并未对会计收益中包含的操纵性应计利润部分进行调整,并根据调整后的真实的会计业绩确定经理报酬,显示出董事会并未很好地履行股东赋予其的职责。Using the basic economic principle of the design of top executive compensations contracts of modern company, this paper has systematically analyzed the relationship between the board of directors of listed company, earnings management, and payperformance sensitivity of top executive compensations of listed company of our country. Based on the theoretical analysis above, multiple variables regression results using 1224 listed companies' cross-section observations in 2004 of Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchanges show that earnings management is significantly positively correlated to pay-performance sensitivity of top executive compensations of listed companies, suggesting that when compa- nies design the contracts of their top executive compensation which are designed based on company accounting performance, top executives have highly incentives to manipulate accounting earnings to adjust their remunerations increasingly. At the same time, the research results also show that, although the board of directors holds important responsibilities for correctly setting up the contracts of executive compensations and assuring the truth of company's accounting performance, the board of directors of listed company doesn't perform the functions well. Finally, this paper puts forward some suggestion on how to strengthen the roles of the board of directors in monitoring earnings management of our listed company.

关 键 词:经理报酬 报酬业绩敏感度 盈余质量 董事会监控 

分 类 号:F272[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F224

 

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