由上市公司治理指数看经理层激励约束机制的改进  

Improvement of top managers' incentive and restrictive mechanism view on listed company's governance index

作　　者：刘晓磊[1] 马召勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北经贸大学研究生学院,石家庄050061

出　　处：《沈阳工程学院学报（社会科学版）》2008年第2期204-207,共4页Journal of Shenyang Institute of Engineering:Social Science

摘　　要：通过分析南开大学公司治理研究中心公开的中国公司治理指数数据,得出结论:经理层治理水平连续三年不断提高;任免制度和执行保障的发展相对较好;只有激励约束机制表现出与经理层治理发展不匹配。而通过分析我国现有激励约束机制——年薪制、持股制和利润分享制对经理层的激励作用,发现年薪制的激励作用不明显;持股制是一种有效的长期激励策略;税前利润分享没有明显的激励作用,税后利润分享则体现了经理人员的人力资本价值。By analyzing the CCGINK （Chinese Corporate Governance Index）, published by Corporate Governance Research Center of Nankai University, draws the conclusions that the of top managers＇ governance level enhanced continually in the past three years; appointment and removal system, executive guarantee system have developed well;but the incentive and restrictive mechanism is incompatible with the development of the top managers＇ governance. By analyzing the impact of present incentive and restrictive mechanism, yearly salary system, stock holding system and profit sharing system on top managers finds out： yearly salary system doesn＇ t has an obvious incentive effect; stock holding system is a long- term incentive tactics;pre- tax profit sharing has no direct incentive effect, and profit sharing after tax embodies the managers＇ human capital value.

关 键 词：经理层治理评价指数 激励约束机制 报酬函数 改进 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]