基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业的公司治理选择  

The Corporate Governance in Family-Controlled Business Based on Agency and Stewardship Theory

作　　者：钟乃雄[1] 曹芳[1] 隋广军[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院 [2]广东外语外贸大学,广东广州510420

出　　处：《改革与战略》2008年第5期34-37,共4页Reformation & Strategy

基　　金：广州市哲学社会科学规划课题"广州市民营企业治理障碍及其完善机制研究"(项目编号:06-YZ3-23)阶段性成果

摘　　要：企业组织是一个非常异质性的组织,企业的不同治理选择潜在影响着企业的代理成本和管家态度,最终体现为能力和企业绩效上的重要区别。文章从代理理论与管家理论这两种不同公司治理视角,分析了家族企业公司治理的四个维度,即家族所有与控制、家族领导能力、多个家族成员的广泛参与以及家族传承计划与实际参与下的各自的代理成本和管家态度,以及对企业能力和绩效的影响。Business organization is a very heterogeneous group. The different governance choices of the business have different impacts on the agency cost and stewardship, which is reflected on the difference of their capabilities and their performance. From the agent and stewardship perspective, the paper begins with four fundamental governance choices that distinguish among different kinds of family businesses： level and mode of family ownership, family leadership, the broader involvement of multiple family members, the planned or actual participation of later generations, and the related impact on firm capability and firm performance.

关 键 词：代理理论 管家理论 家族企业 公司治理 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]