所有利益相关者参与公司治理并非最有效率  

Some Thoughts on Stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance

作　　者：张岭松[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济管理》2008年第11期92-96,共5页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：利益相关者公司治理模式强调所有利益相关者的利益最大化,从其目标本身来看,是无可非议的。但该模式通过管理层的广泛任务和分享控制权来内部化股东行为的负外部性,容易产生管理层激励设计难、融资和决策效率低等问题。本文认为,所有利益相关者参与公司治理并不是保护其利益的有效制度安排,而应该在坚持股东价值的范式下,通过契约和法律形式实现其他利益相关者的利益保护。Corporate governance originates from the agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control. Its main idea is to maximize the shareholder value by managerial incentives and large shareholder control. With its goals aiming at maximizing the stakeholder value, there are no objections to the goals advanced by the proponents of stakeholder model of corporate governance. However, the stakeholder model has its critical defects on the design of managerial incentives, financing and decision making, since its main idea is to internalize the negative externalities of shareholder behavior with multiple managerial missions and sharing of control. So, it is not a good system to protect the interest of stakeholders. While we should insist on the shareholder value paradigm, contractual and legal apparatus are better for the protection of stakeholder interest.

关 键 词：公司治理 股东价值 利益相关者 管理层激励 控制权 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]