基于公平偏好的同事压力及团队合作机制  

Peer Pressure and Team Cooperation Based on Fairness Preference

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 覃燕红[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2008年第6期64-69,共6页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(07XJL004)

摘　　要：以行为博弈论为分析工具,通过引入纯粹自利偏好之外的公平偏好,研究了同事压力的形成机制及其对团队合作的激励机制,指出由很强的公平偏好单独形成的内部同事压力,以及由惩罚成本不太高的同事惩罚和强度不太弱的公平偏好共同形成的外部同事压力,对团队合作都有重要的激励作用。因此,培养和增强员工的公平偏好是促进团队合作的重要措施。With methodology of behavioral game theory, this paper studies the mechanism of forming peer pressure and its promotion for team cooperation by introducing fairness preference besides traditional pure self- interest preference. It is found that the internal pressure stems from extremely strong fairness preference, while peer sanction without too high sanction cost and fairness preference that is not too weak will resuit in external pressure, both of which can facihtate team cooperation. Therefore, to cultivate and strengthen fairness preference of employees is one of the most important systems for promoting team cooperation, which is referable for human resources management in enterprises and research of organizational behaviors with economic methodology of behavioral game theory.

关 键 词：公平偏好 同事压力 团队合作 激励机制 行为博弈论 

分 类 号：F244.3[经济管理—劳动经济] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]