科技创新与国防R&D激励——基于委托代理框架的博弈分析  

Defense R&D Incentives with Science and Technology Innovation——The Gaming Analysis Based on the Framework of Agent—Principle Theory

作　　者：马惠军[1] 罗敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]军事经济学院国防经济系

出　　处：《南方经济》2008年第6期31-42,80,共13页South China Journal of Economics

摘　　要：国防R&D是国防科技创新的源泉。国防R&D活动存在着复杂的委托代理关系,导致分摊成本和信息租金的增加。本文用委托代理理论框架对国防R&D行为主体进行激励分析,通过构建政府与军队、军队与企业在信息不对称条件下的博弈模型,揭示国防R&D活动运行的内在机理以及投资低效的深层次原因,进而对国防R&D活动激励机制进行了针对性设计,提出了一些有意义的对策性思考。Defense R＆D is the headspring of defense technology innovation. There is complicated relationship in defense R＆D activities, which results in the increase of apportionment cost and information rents. This paper analyzes the incentives in the subject＇s behavior of defense R＆D based on the framework of agent-principle theory. It indicates the inner mechanism in defense R＆D activities and the radical reason of low efficiency in investing through constructing the gaming model between the government, the army and enterprise under the conditions of information asymmetry. At last, it puts forward a design for the defense R＆D incentive mechanism and also gives some countermeasures.

关 键 词：国防 R&D 激励机制 委托代理 

分 类 号：E0-054[军事—军事理论]