隐性知识外包的激励机制研究  

Research of Incentive Mechanism in Tacit Knowledge Outsourcing

作　　者：涂静[1,2] 马辉民[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074 [2]武汉科技大学管理学院,武汉430081

出　　处：《图书情报工作》2008年第10期58-61,88,共5页Library and Information Service

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“移动商务应用模式和发展对策研究”(项目编号:06BJY101)研究成果之一

摘　　要：针对隐性知识外包中知识转移的激励问题,提出一个四阶段动态博弈模型:第一阶段客户设计激励合约;第二阶段服务商决定是否接受合约;第三阶段服务商决定转移的知识量;第四阶段客户决定产品产量。通过对模型的求解和分析,得出激励合约的特征,客户激励的有效性以及影响服务商知识转移的因素,为客户隐性知识外包的有效激励提供决策依据。This paper considers a four-stage dynamic game model on the strategies between client and vendor in tacit knowledge outsourcing and studies the incentive mechanism for knowledge transfer. In the first stage, the client designs an incentive contract. In the second stage, the vendor decides whether to accept the contract or not. In the third stage, the vendor decides the amount of knowledge to transfer. In the fourth stage, the client decides the quantity. By solving and analyzing the model, the authors get characteristics of incentive ,the effectiveness of incentive mechanism and the factors which affect the transfer of vendor＇ s knowledge. The results provide basis for client＇ s successful outsourcing decision making.

关 键 词：隐性知识外包 激励合约 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]