意识是“我能”——梅洛-庞蒂的“我能”现象学探究  

Conscience is "I Can":Exploring Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of "I Can"

作　　者：莫伟民[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《复旦学报（社会科学版）》2008年第6期50-57,共8页Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

基　　金：莫伟民承担的国家社科基金项目(项目批准号:07BZX045);复旦大学"985工程"项目(项目批准号:05FCZD0010)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：针对经验论把世界看做"意识的状态"从而低估了意识,而理智论则把世界解释为"状态的意识"从而高估了意识这一情况,梅洛-庞蒂的知觉现象学认为意识不是"我思"而是"我能",旨在超越经验论与理智论。梅洛-庞蒂的"我能"现象学直接影响了利科的"自身解释学"和福柯的"自身关切"的伦理学,在20世纪哲学界具有重要地位。Empiricism regards the world as the state of conscience and thus underestimates conscience,whereas intellectualism interprets the world as the conscience of state and thus overestimates the con- science. Merleau-Ponty＇s phenomenology of perception holds that conscience is not ＂I think that,＂ but is ＂I call. ＂ It aims to transcend empiricism and intellectualism. Merleau-Ponty＇s phenomenology of ＂I can＂ had a direct influence on Ricoeur＇s hermeneutics of self and Foucauh＇ s ethics as care of self. It had taken an important place in the 20^th century philosophy.

关 键 词：意识 我思 我能 梅洛-庞蒂 利科 福柯 

分 类 号：B565[哲学宗教—外国哲学]