准时制下再制造逆向供应链成本契约激励分析  

Cost contract incentives and analysis for the reverse supply chain of remanufacturing base on JIT

作　　者：黄凌[1,2] 达庆利[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096 [2]山东财政学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《山东大学学报（工学版）》2008年第6期105-111,共7页Journal of Shandong University（Engineering Science）

摘　　要：针对再制造逆向供应链,从再制造与回收双方行为动机角度出发,考虑回收处理时间的随机性,引入奖励和惩罚变量,对准时制下制造商如何利用奖励和惩罚契约实现双方期望成本最小,从而达到理想和最佳的交货时间及交货概率进行了分析,并用算例探讨了各成本参数变动对决策产生的影响.Incentive mechanisms for the reverse supply chain were studied through the view of the motivation between remanufacturing and callback behaviors.Considering the randomness of recycle response time,variables of penalty cost and bonus were introduced.The way to realize the minimum cost and get expected optimal delivery time and probability by penalty policy and incentive contract for manufacturvs was forecasted and case analysis illuminated the effect that inventory cost parameters impact on contract decision.

关 键 词：再制造 逆向供应链 准时制 契约激励 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F406[经济管理—国民经济]