公平偏好约束、身份模糊化与国企经营者薪酬管制--基于行为合约理论的分析  

Fairness Preference Constraints,Identity Ambiguity and Managers' Salary Regulation in State-owned Enterprises——An Analysis Based on Behavioral Contract Theory

作　　者：黄再胜[1,2] 王玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院博士后流动站,上海200083 [2]南京政治学院上海分院,上海200433

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2009年第1期41-46,共6页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：中国博士后基金面上资助项目:“企业员工战略共享的激励机理、模式与应用研究”(20080430647)

摘　　要：转型期,出于对国有企业收入初次分配的公平偏好和国有企业经营者身份的模糊性,政府主管部门对国有企业经营者薪酬水平进行直接的动态管制。这种来自政府的直接管制,造成国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制的扭曲和低效率。进一步理顺政企关系,改革和完善国有企业经营者的选择机制和定价机制,明晰国有企业经营者身份和薪酬增长合理化,是弱化当前国有企业收入初次分配中公平偏好约束,规范和完善国有企业经营者薪酬增长机制的根本途径。During the transition period, because of the fairness preference of primary income distribution and the identity ambiguity of Managers in state -owned enterprises（SOEs） ,the salary level of managers are directly regulated by the governmental authorities. This kind of direct regulation from the government leads to the distortion and inefficiency of managers＇ salary promotion mechanism in SOEs. The basic way to weaken the constraints of fairness preferences of prime income distribution, and to regulate and improve the salary increase mechanism of managers in SOEs is to further analyze the relationships between the government and SOEs, reform and improve the selection mechanism and the pricing mechanism of SOE managers, clarify the identity of SOE managers and rationalize their salary increase.

关 键 词：薪酬管制 公平偏好 身份模糊 保留收入 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]