公平偏好、身份模糊与国企经营者薪酬规制  

Fairness Preference,Identity Ambiguity and Top Managers' Compensation Regulation in Stated-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：黄再胜[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院博士后流动站 [2]南京政治学院上海分院,上海200433

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2009年第1期1-7,共7页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：中国博士后基金第43批面上资助项目(项目编号:20080430647)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：转型期,政府主管部门为何要对国企经营者薪酬进行严格的规制?本文建立了一个包含政府主管部门公平偏好的薪酬激励模型,强调薪酬规制内生于政府对社会公平问题的关注和转型期国企经营者身份的模糊性。出于对国企初次收入分配的公平偏好,政府主管部门对国企经营者薪酬有进行规制的冲动或倾向;而转型期国企经营者的身份模糊性,直接导致其保留收入的不确定性,进而为政府主管部门实施薪酬规制提供了现实条件。Why government regulation on SOE top managers' compensations during the transition period? This paper proposes a compensation incentive model involving government fairness preference.It emphasizes that compensation regulation is caused by government social fairness concern and the ambiguity of SOE top managers' identity.As a result of fairness preference on SOE first income distribution,there exists a tendency for the government to regulate top managers' compensations in stated-owned enterprises.The ambiguity of SOE top managers' identity leads to the uncertainty of their reservation income,which provides a real basis for the government to regulate the top managers' compensations in stated-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：薪酬规制 公平偏好 身份模糊 保留收入 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]