非对称过度自信条件下委托代理模型  

Principal-agent model based on the principal and agent's asymmetric overconfidence

作　　者：黄健柏[1] 杨涛[1] 伍如昕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2009年第4期92-102,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70672016);教育部科学技术重点项目(104260);中南大学研究生教育创新工程项目(1343-77205)

摘　　要：针对不同过度自信水平的委托人和代理人的委托代理关系研究缺乏的问题,通过数理推导研究分析了次优和最优情形下委托人和代理人非对称的过度自信水平对努力水平、激励系数的影响,并应用实验研究有效地验证了模型推导的结论.与委托人和代理人都是理性时的研究结论不同的是,当委托人和代理人过度自信水平不同时,设计最优报酬契约时仍需要向代理人实施激励.研究结果对设计报酬契约、提高激励效率等方面有重要应用价值.The existing research on the principal-agent relationship based on asymmetric overconfidence is rare. The problem is studied in this article through mathematical derivement. And the influence mechanism of asymmetric overconfidence to incentive coefficient and the effort level is analyzed on the second-best and first-best occasion. The conclusion is different to the existing studies which assume that the principal and the agent are rational. When the overconfidence level of the principal and the agent is asymmetric, the incentive to the agent is still needed in the optimal contract. The conclusion deduced from the model is supported by an experimental study. Conclusions have an important application value on designment of compensation contract, enhancement of incentive efficiency and so on.

关 键 词：过度自信 非对称 委托代理 实验 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]