代建制下激励机制问题研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Agent Construction System

作　　者：曾国华 

机构地区：[1]北京市基础设施投资有限公司,北京100101

出　　处：《建筑经济》2009年第5期67-70,共4页Construction Economy

基　　金：国家十一五科技支撑计划重点项目(2006BAG02B00)

摘　　要：代建制下投资人与代建人之间的关系是多任务的委托代理关系。由于投资人无法在使用之前对代建工程质量进行客观评价,且产权移交和主观评价等激励机制在代建制中实施会存在许多问题,因此根据多任务委托代理问题分析结果,此时投资人给予代建人固定工资是最优的激励机制。考虑到工程质量与代建人的努力水平,工程质量与代建工程后续维修加固费用均存在正相关函数关系,延后激励奖惩实现时间,以使用阶段代建工程的维修加固费用指标作为对提高工程质量这一任务的激励依据,并采用使用阶段实现激励奖惩的方式,能够有效地缓解投资人、代建人双方的信息不对称矛盾,提高投资人对代建人激励水平,从而双方获得更大的效益。The relationship between investor and construction agent is multi-task principal-agent. The fixed salary will be the optimum incentive mechanism before project＇s usage, because objective evaluation can＇t be made and problems will be arisen due to assets transfer and subjective evaluation, etc. Since the project qualification-construction agent＇s effort, project qualification-cost of maintenance are positive correlation, cost of maintenance can be used as the signal of incentive basis, rewards and punishment will be postponed and executed during project＇s usage. The contradiction due to information asymmetry can be released, the incentive intensity will be increased and more profit will be gotten by investor and construction agent.

关 键 词：代建制 激励机制 委托代理理论 多任务 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]