二元劳工市场、解雇保护与劳动合同法  

Dual Labor Market,Dismissal Protection and Labor Contracts Law

作　　者：唐跃军[1] 赵武阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,200433

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2009年第1期122-132,152,共12页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802015;70572026)资助

摘　　要：本文基于中国二元劳工市场,构建理论模型分析《劳动合同法》的影响,整合学界、业界和社会公众对《劳动合同法》加强解雇保护的不同意见。研究表明,相对于《劳动法》,《劳动合同法》通过加强解雇保护,能提高知识型员工的努力程度,增加知识型员工和企业的收益;但却会降低体力型员工的努力程度,减少劳动密集型企业的收益。虽然《劳动合同法》能提高在职体力型员工的收益,但却由于企业主缩减体力岗位,使得更多体力提供者丧失就业机会。简而言之,对于高端劳工市场,《劳动合同法》是促进三赢的;而对于低端劳工市场,则可能导致三输。The paper,based on Chinese dual labor market,constructs a theoretical model to analyze the impacts of Labor Contracts Law in order to integrate the debates from academic, business and public field. The model indicates that, compared with Labor Law, Labor Contracts Law can improve knowledge workers＇ efforts ,increase knowledge workers＇ and knowledge-intensive enterprises＇ benefits;however,Labor Contracts Law reduces manual workers＇ efforts ,decreases labor-intensive enterprises＇ benefits. Though Labor Contracts Law increases incumbent manual workers＇ payments, it results that more manual workers lose the opportunities to be employed, for employers will reduce manual job positions. Generally speaking,the new law may lead to triple-win in high-end labor market while result in triple-loss in low-end labor market.

关 键 词：二元劳工市场 解雇保护 《劳动合同法》 

分 类 号：D922.52[政治法律—民商法学]