需求分布未知条件下的供应链鲁棒主从对策  

Robust Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain Under Unknown Demand Distribution Information

作　　者：邱若臻[1] 黄小原[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第8期1208-1212,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(70702037);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088)

摘　　要：研究了需求不确定条件下的供应链鲁棒主从对策问题.考虑了未知需求分布信息条件下的两级供应链系统.其中,制造商作为主方,决定产品批发价格;零售商作为从方,决定产品订货量.这一问题又被称为需求分布信息的期望值问题.推导了仅知需求均值和方差信息条件下,集成供应链和分散供应链鲁棒订货量与批发价格决策,分析了该决策下的供应链系统及其成员利润情况.最后进行了数值计算,验证了当已知需求具体分布时供应链鲁棒主从对策的有效性.结果表明:对于集成供应链来说,采取鲁棒订货策略将损失一定数量的利润;而对于分散供应链来说,采取鲁棒主从对策策略将使供应链总利润得以提高.Studies the robust Stackelberg game of supply chain based on uncertain demand. A two-stage supply chain system is considered, where the supplier and retailer play the roles of leader and follower in deciding the wholesale price and order quantity, respectively. This problem is regarded as the expected value of distribution information on demand. The decisions for robust order quantity and wholesale price of centralized and decentralized supply chains are deduced under the conditions that only the information on the mean and variance of demand has been known, and the profits of supply chain and its members are analyzed according to the decisions. A numerical calculation was done to verify the effectiveness of the robust Stackelberg game of supply chain if the definite distribution of demand has been known. The result showed that the robust ordering strategy will reduce the profit from centralized supply chain to a certain extent, while the robust Stackelberg game will increase the profit from decentralized supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 鲁棒性 主从对策 需求分布 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]