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机构地区:[1]辽宁工程技术大学营销管理学院,葫芦岛125105
出 处:《管理评论》2009年第11期44-51,共8页Management Review
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目资助(70672035)
摘 要:在营销渠道的管理中,企业通常会通过设计一系列契约条件对中间商进行监督和激励,整个过程很少考虑来自市场第三方——消费者的信息反馈。本文指出和分析了消费者信息在三方经济关系中的作用。通过企业、消费者和中间商的定量模型,分析了消费者信息对企业激励与监督营销渠道中间商行为的影响,以及提高营销渠道的效率影响因素和条件。本文的结论是:当消费者偏好和企业偏好不一致时,过多的消费者反馈信息会降低渠道管理效率。In channel management, enterprises usually design a set of contracts to monitor and stimulate dealers, consequently, the channel management focused on research the relationship between enterprise and dealer or dealer and costumer or enterprise and consumer. Consumer complaint and information feedback from consumers as the third party in the market activity are only considered indirectly in the whole channel management. But the consumer complaint and consumer information feedback take an important role in modem marketing channel management. This paper puts forward and analyzes the direct impact of consumer information among triadic economic relationship. By establishing a management model involved in enterprise utility, consumers information, and dealers' stimulation based on game theory and channel relationship management, it analyzes the influence of consumer information on enterprises' stimulation and monitoring of dealer behavior and factors contributing to improvement of the efficiency of marketing channels. The results are explained by a firm case, sampling 6609 consumers from 14 cities in china. The findings suggest that: when consumer preference is not consistent with enterprise preference, it does not ensure that consumer complaint or consumer information feedback facilitates the improvement of channel management performance and consumer benefit.
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