食品安全生产与政府监管行为的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on the Behavior of Food Safety in Production and Government Regulation

作　　者：张振彦[1] 杨桂红[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学工商管理学院,云南昆明650221

出　　处：《科技信息》2009年第29期197-198,390,共3页Science & Technology Information

摘　　要：在食品行业中由于竞争压力的不断增大,企业为了自身的生存,压低生产成本,造成食品安全问题不断出现。生产者和消费者之间的信息不对称也成为食品安全问题出现的重要原因。因此,政府监管在整个食品安全生产过程中显得尤为重要,食品的生产与监管过程也成了政府相关部门与食品生产企业之间相互博弈的过程。本文主要以博弈模型为基础,对政府监管部门和食品生产企业进行博弈分析,分析表明政府监管的有效性取决于加大对违规的惩罚力度、降低以劣质食品冒充安全食品坑害消费者而获得的额外预期收益、不断降低监督检查成本。As a result of increasing competitive pressures in the food industry, Enterprises for their own survival, down production costs, Caused by emerging food safety issues. Between producers and consumers of information asymmetry which is becoming an important reason in the Food Safety too. So, government regulation has become very important in the whole process of food safety production, the process of food production and supervision has become the course of each game between the government departments and food production enterprises. This article is based on a game model, analyses about government regulatory authorities and food manufacturers, Analysis showed that the effectiveness of government regulation depends on the increase penalties for violations, reduce the expected return to additional which posing poor-quality food as safe food to harem consumers, continue to lower the cost of supervision and inspection.

关 键 词：食品安全 政府监管 博弈论 

分 类 号：TS207[轻工技术与工程—食品科学] O225[轻工技术与工程—食品科学与工程]