关于自我知识权威性的再思考  

Reconsidering the Authority of Self-Knowledge

作　　者：田平[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心,哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2009年第11期27-32,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金资助(06JJD720004)

摘　　要：笛卡尔式自我知识的无条件的权威性,在当代受到语义外在论的挑战。然而,接受外在论的观点并不意味着对自我知识权威性的一般否定。一方面,自我知识的辩护不依赖关于环境的经验证据,因而与关于外部世界的知识和他心知识相比,自我知识在某种重要的意义上确有权威性。另一方面,自我知识内容的确定依赖环境预设,因而与笛卡尔的主张相比,自我知识的权威性是有条件的弱权威性。自我知识的弱权威性是自我知识外在性的一个逻辑结果。这种对自我知识权威性的新看法维护了我们关于自我知识权威性的常识信念。The Cartesian view of the strong authority of self--knowledge is challenged in the recent decades by the semantic externalism. How- ever, we can accept externalism without generally denying the authority of self- knowledge. On the one hand, the justification of self--knowl- edge does not rely on the empirical evidence of environmental conditions, therefore in contrast with the knowledge of the external world and oth- er minds, self--knowledge do have certain authority in an important sense; and on the other hand, the determination of the content of self-- knowledge depends on certain environmental presuppositions, therefore in contrast with the Cartesian view, the authority of self--knowledge is conditional and weak. This weak authority is a logical consequence of the externality of self-- knowledge. This new notion of the authority of self--knowledge is consistent with our commonsense conviction of the authority.

关 键 词：笛卡尔 自我知识 自我知识的权威性 外在论 内在论 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]