基于涉他偏好理论的员工激励机制设计  

The Employee Incentive Based on Other-regarding Preference Theory

作　　者：郭心毅[1] 蒲勇健[1] 刘飞宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《软科学》2009年第12期104-107,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY017)

摘　　要：将行为经济学和心理博弈论的涉他偏好观点引入委托-代理模型,分析激励效率及契约结构,研究员工激励机制问题。结果表明,企业员工的努力选择会受到其他相似员工收益的影响,涉他偏好能促进员工提高努力水平,既是一种激励措施也是一种激励约束,并对企业的收益和成本控制存在正负两方面的影响。This paper analyzes the incentive efficiency and contract structures of agents（ i. e. , employees） under other-regarding preference, in which the agents are inclined to compare their incomes with other analogous ones from same industry. Result shows that the agent＇s choice of effort level will be affected by the others＇wage, and the other - regarding preference can improve the effort of agents. Also this preference promotes as well as restricts the incentive to agents, and has negative and positive effects on the efficiency of corporation.

关 键 词：涉他偏好 委托-代理 激励机制 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]