多元化、公司业绩与总经理变更  

Diversification,Firm Performance and CEO Turnover

作　　者：欧阳瑞[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融系,广州510632

出　　处：《管理科学》2010年第1期44-51,共8页Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：总经理变更是公司内部治理的重要手段,其业绩敏感性受到多种因素的影响,以2002年～2007年沪深两市702家A股上市公司的数据为样本,探讨多元化经营对总经理变更绩效敏感性及其业绩改进效应的影响,为公司经营模式对公司治理效率的影响提供经验证据,利用传统的Logistic回归、边际效应分析以及面板数据随机效应回归对多元化和总经理变更的关系进行研究。实证结果表明,多元化降低了总经理变更的业绩敏感性,多元化公司总经理变更的概率与资产收益率代表的多元化公司业绩变化没有显著的关系,即使在公司业绩下降的条件下,股东替换总经理的动机也弱于集中化公司;多元化公司总经理变更后的资产重组行为规模显著弱于集中化公司,带来的业绩改进也小于集中化公司。The forced turnover of CEO at right time is an important part of the internal governance mechanism. The sensitivity to firm performance of CEO turnover will be influenced by many factors. Based on the sample consisting of 702 listed company both on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange from 2002 to 2007, analyze the effects of diversification on the sensitivity to the firm performance and performance improvement of CEO turnover. The relationship between diversification and CEO turnover is analyzed with Logistic regression, Marginal effects analysis and Random effects analysis of panel data. The results of empirical test show that diversification lower the sensitivity to performance of CEO turnover, the probability of turnover is unrelated to performance proxy by ROA for diversification firms, the intension to change the CEO is weaker even when performance of the firm is declining; the restructure following the turnover is weaker in diversification firms than focused firms and the improvement of performance is also not distinctive.

关 键 词：多元化 业绩 总经理变更 敏感性 业绩改进 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]