经理才能、公司治理与契约参照点--中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的理论与实证分析  

Manager Talents, Corporate Governance and Reference Point:The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Firms

作　　者：李维安[1,2] 刘绪光[1,2] 陈靖涵 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心 [2]南开大学商学院 [3]英国萨瑞大学商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2010年第2期4-15,共12页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532001);国家自然科学基金青年项目(70802031);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地南开大学公司治理研究中心重大项目(08JJD630007)资助

摘　　要：本文沿着中国企业激励制度市场化改革和全球公司治理趋同这两条主线,基于超越最优契约范式的市场配置视角、经理权力视角以及契约订立过程中的参照点效应,提出了关于中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的三组理论假设。基于502家上市公司2001至2006年平衡面板数据的实证研究显示,高管薪酬水平的上升反映了市场对经理才能日益增长的竞争性需求,但旨在约束经理权力、构架"完备"的公司治理机制并未发挥有效作用。此外,国际同行的薪酬基准对中国公司的高管薪酬决策具有参照点效应,这种薪酬设定过程中存在的参照点效应因薪酬委员会的存在而被放大。This paper investigates the determinants of Chinese executive compensation under the market oriented reforms and global governance convergence. We contribute to corporate governance literature of executive compensation by building an integrated theoretical model, combining market force approach as an extension of optimal contracting theory, managerial power approach and behaveoural contracting approach. We propose three hypotheses from the perspectives of market demand for managerial talents, managerial power and global pay reference point effect with regard to the Chinese executive pay setting process. We further provide empirical tests for our hypotheses using a panel analysis as an improvement for the short-period cross sectional analysis adopted by the extant literature on Chinese executive compensation. Our panel data set enables us to control the potential biased problem caused by unobservable individual and time effects, which is particularly important given the information disclosure limitations in China. The rich information contents from the large observations also allow us to reveal the dynamic evolution of Chinese executive compensation. Our findings show that the increasing pay level of Chinese executive reflects competitive market demand for manager talents. Large firms with complex operations and growing firms with more growing opportunities and better prior performance tend to provide pay premiums for manager talents. However, Chinese corporate governance mechanisms do not seem to be functioning in restraining managerial influence on and their possible manipulation in their pay setting process. Those managers who also serve as the board chairman are likely to receive higher compensation. Executive shareholding also has an influence on the board pay decisions. With regard to the ownership, we find block shareholders in Chinese firms play a positive role in constraining managers＇ self-dealing on their pay level. Finally, the competitive global pay benchmark has a considerable impact on the decisio

关 键 词：高管薪酬 经理才能 公司治理 契约参照点 薪酬委员会 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]