双寡头市场中品牌广告竞争和大类广告合作策略研究  

Competitive Brand Advertising and Cooperative Generic Advertising Strategies in Duopoly

作　　者：聂佳佳[1,2] 熊中楷[1] 曹俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第2期134-142,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571088)

摘　　要：利用微分对策理论研究了一强一弱双寡头垄断市场中的品牌广告竞争和大类广告合作策略,提出了一个Stackelberg博弈模型,采用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程求得了模型的均衡品牌广告、大类广告和价值函数,给出了市场份额计算公式。研究发现:与非合作策略相比,大类广告合作策略下,无论强者还是弱者,他们的销售量都增加了,同时两个企业的品牌广告投入也增加了;通过大类广告合作策略,无论强者(领导者)还是弱者(追随者),他们的利润都得到了提高;强者、弱者和行业的大类广告投入分别高于非合作下强者、弱者和行业的大类广告投入。This paper studies competitive brand advertising and cooperative generic advertising strategies in the market with a dominant firm and a weak firm,and gives a Stackelberg game model.Then,the equilibrium brand advertising,generic advertising,value function and the equation of market sharing are obtained from the model with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.The research shows that the sale and the profit of the dominant firm and the weak firm in cooperative strategy are higher than that in non-cooperative strategy respectively.Furthermore,the generic advertising costs of the dominant,the weak and the industry are higher than that in non-cooperative strategy respectively.

关 键 词：市场份额 品牌广告 大类广告合作 微分对策 反馈Nash均衡 汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]