最优的分权和激励安排:一个正式模型  

Optimal Decentralization and Incentives:A Formal Model

作　　者：杨其静[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院企业与组织研究中心

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2010年第1期111-119,共9页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金："全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项课题";"教育部新世纪人才计划"的支持

摘　　要：本文将工业化和城市化理解为是一个资源从低效部门向高效部门转移的过程。借助一个正式模型,本文证明中央—地方分权下的辖区竞争将促使地方政府向工商企业提供尽可能多的帮助之手,从而促进了经济增长;但与此同时,财力有限的地方政府也将向弱势群体伸出掠夺之手,从而危害了社会和谐。因此,中央政府必须设定恰当的政绩考评体系,并赋予地方政府恰当的权力,以便促使地方政府在发展经济与维护社会和谐之间做出恰当的权衡。The development is considered as the process of industrialization and urbanization in this paper. By virtue of a formal model, we find decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition may spur the local governments to give enterprises and investors warm helping hand, thereby promoting economic growth. Meantime, it may also motivate local governments to give the vulnerable groups cold grabbing hand, thus endangering the social harmony. Therefore, the central government must set the appropriate performance appraisal system, and decentralize the appropriate authority to local governments in order to induce local governments to balance economic growth and social harmony.

关 键 词：分权 激励合约 增长 社会和谐 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]