“以县为主”背景下的西部农村教育人事体制和教师激励机制  

Allocation of Personnel Power and Teacher Incentive Scheme in Rural Education System:Evidence from "To-the-county Reform" in Western China

作　　者：李小土[1] 刘明兴[2] 安雪慧[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,北京100871 [2]北京大学中国教育财政科学研究所,北京100871 [3]国家教育发展研究中心,北京100816

出　　处：《教师教育研究》2010年第3期49-55,共7页Teacher Education Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70573028);世界银行"年轻学者支持计划"(7137639)

摘　　要：本文在西部甲省20个县(50个乡镇)的抽样调查基础上,对农村基层学区人事管理体制和教师激励机制进行实证分析。研究发现,人事权力的配置与教师激励机制存在密切关系。由县教育局任命学区校长、并且由学区校长调配学区内教师的权力格局,比较有利于基层教师激励机制的建立;而人事权力的过度集中,或者县教育局和乡镇政府进行交叉控制,都不利于基层学区对教师的管理与激励。Based on a random survey for 50 school districts in 20 counties of western China, this paper empirically discusses the allocation of personnel powers and its impact on the design of teacher incentive scheme in rural education system. It shows that the moderate autonomy of personnel management for rural education district might facilitate the establishment of teacher＇ s incentive scheme. In such districts, the county education bureau controls the appointment of governor of township district, while the governor decides to allocate the teachers within the district. On the contrast, the excessive centralization by the county government or cross-cutting struggles of personnel powers between the different political bodies could undermine the incentive to teachers. Comparing with these two modes, the township government can make the better management of teachers, if it uniformly controls the personnel powers in rural education district.

关 键 词：农村教育 人事权力 激励机制 

分 类 号：G472.3[文化科学—教育学]