核心雇员、信息与企业家才能租金  

Critical Employee,Information and Entrepreneurial Rents

作　　者：李石强[1] 杨晓维[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国青年政治学院经济系 [2]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《经济评论》2010年第4期16-22,共7页Economic Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金“劳动定价与收入差别”(课题批准号:08JA790009)的资助

摘　　要：本文分析作为雇主的企业家通过掌握潜在核心雇员创造企业租金潜质的私人信息而赚取租金的特质。如果一个企业家能够先于竞争对手发现某个潜在的未被发掘的人才,就能在竞争性劳动力市场上以保留工资水平将其雇佣。该人才作为企业不可完全替代的核心雇员,能够制造不可完全替代的产品从而为企业带来垄断收益。由于拥有关于核心雇员能力的私人信息,企业家将获得垄断收益作为信息租金。长期来看,在核心雇员的生产能力成为公共信息后,劳动力市场针对他所展开的买方竞争会推动其收入上升到企业家租金消失为止。为了继续获得这种信息租金,企业家要么不断深入发现该核心雇员新的潜在能力,要么寻找新的未被其他企业发现的潜在人才。This article discusses the entrepreneurial rents from the entrepreneur＇s private information about the firm＇s critical employees＇ capability of creating monopoly revenue. If the entrepreneur discovers a potential critical employee prior to all of his competitors, he can employ him at his reserve wage. Unable to be totally substituted, the critical employee can create monopoly revenues, which becomes the entrepreneur＇s rents because of his private information about the critical employee＇s capability. In the long - run, when the information becomes public, the employee＇ s income will increase due to the competition among all the firms till his current employer cannot get any rent. In order to gain rents continually, the entrepreneur can either discover and make use of new information of the same employee or find a new potential one.

关 键 词：核心雇员 企业家才能 信息租金 不对称雇主学习 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]