关联交易、会计信息契约有用性与公司治理——基于上市公司高管更换的视角  

Related-party Transactions and the Role of Accounting Information in Corporate Governance and Contracting ——Evidence from Top Management Turnover at the Listed Companies in China

作　　者：王化成[1] 张伟华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国软科学》2010年第8期117-125,共9页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872106);国家自然科学基金项目(70902076);国家社会科学基金项目(10CGL016)

摘　　要：会计信息在高管动态激励契约中发挥作用,关联交易会影响会计信息的质量,进而会影响其契约有用性。研究发现,我国上市公司高管更换概率与公司会计业绩负相关,关联交易的发生降低了会计信息的契约有用性,而这种影响只发生在其他应收和其他应付两类关联交易中,而商品和劳务购销类的关联交易则没有显著影响。As the method to measure management-effort-level,the accounting information plays the significant role in stimulating the high-level management dynamic-incentive contract,while the related transaction would affect the quality of accounting information,then would affect its contract usefulness.We find that the replacement of high-level management of Chinese listed companies is negatively related with corporation accounting performance,the occurrence of related transaction would reduce the usefulness of accounting information contract.However,such a deceasing could only happen in ＂other receivable＂ and ＂other payable＂ items,the related transactions of efficiency-promoting items would not affect the role of accounting information in corporation governance.

关 键 词：关联交易 公司治理 高管更换 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]