试论企业经营者股权激励与人力资本产权收益  

Issues on Top Executives Stock-based Compensation and Human Capital Property Income

作　　者：向显湖[1] 钟文[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,610074

出　　处：《会计研究》2010年第10期67-75,共9页Accounting Research

摘　　要：经营者股权激励作为解决经营者代理问题的一种治理机制,符合理论逻辑。但从实践效果看,大量研究表明,经营者股权激励不仅在效率上存在逻辑悖论,而且引发了新的道德风险。本文分析了经营者股权激励低效率的原因,并认为要从根本上解决代理问题,应当确认企业经营者人力资本产权,并赋予经营者人力资本产权收益。在此基础上,对经营者人力资本产权特性、经营者人力资本产权收益及构成、经营者人力资本产权收益的实现方式与模式等问题进行了研究。Stock-based Compensation is consistent with theoretical logic as a governance mechanism to solve the manager agency problem.However,from a practical effect,the large number of studies show that there is not only logical paradox,but also moral hazard in the efficiency of equity incentive.This paper analyzes the reasons for the low efficiency of equity incentives,and indicates that,to fundamentally solve the agency problem,human capital property rights should be recognized and human capital income from property should be given to operators.On this basis,this paper discusses characteristics of human capital property right,property income and its composition,the realization approach and model of property income,and other issues.

关 键 词：经营者 股权激励 人力资本产权 人力资本产权收益 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]