煤矿安全视角下国有煤炭企业经理的多任务委托代理问题分析  

Study on SOCE Managers'Multi-task,Principal-agent Incentive Issues Based on Coal Mine Safety

作　　者：时海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南理工大学经济管理学院,河南焦作454000

出　　处：《河南理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第3期283-286,共4页Journal of Henan Polytechnic University:Social Sciences

摘　　要：运用多任务委托代理模型,构建国家与国有煤炭企业经理双重任务委托模型,以求国有煤矿安全事故频发诸多原因背后的机理。模型分析指出:在双重任务激励成本相互替代条件下,委托人对煤炭产出量委托任务的强激励会诱使代理人忽视对企业煤炭安全投入委托任务的努力;对任何给定工作的激励不仅取决于该项工作本身的可观测性,而且还取决于其他工作的可观测性。该理论为我国国有煤炭企业经理激励制度的改革提供了理论依据。By means of the multi-task principal-agent model theory and the double-task principal-agent model, the author tries to explore the deeper mechanical causes of the state-owned coalmine enterprises＇ accidents. By analysis, this paper points out that when the incentive costs of the two tasks are inter-substituted, the strong incentive for a SOCE manager who are responsible for the output will induce him to ignore the dangers of the coal mine safety, and it also points out that any incentive to the assumed task should depend on not only the degree of its own observability but also the other ones. This theoretical study provides scientific basis for the incentive reform of the SOCE managers in China.

关 键 词：多任务 国有煤炭企业经理激励 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]