高校管理部门与教师的委托-代理问题  

Principal-Agent Problems of Administrative Departments and Teachers in Colleges

作　　者：谢芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学继续教育学院,天津300020

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第6期527-529,共3页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

摘　　要：高校管理部门与教师之间是一个标准的委托代理关系。由于委托人和代理人间信息不对称,就会造成代理人不努力行为的出现,产生教学质量下降等问题。依据委托代理理论,提出了高校管理部门与教师间的委托代理模型,构建了委托人的期望效用函数和代理人的期望效用函数,并进行了求解,得到了帕累托最优。最后,提出了建立高校内外相结合的激励竞争机制、报酬激励竞争机制、竞争约束机制和后勤服务保障机制的建议。It is a typical principal and agent relation between administrative departments and teachers in colleges.Due to information asymmetry between principal and agent,the issue of agent no effort and teaching quality descending will occur.According to principal-agent theory,a principal-agent model was constracted between the administrative departments and teachers in colleges.The principal＇s expected utility function and agent＇s expected utility function were established.Then the model was solved and pareto dominance is achieved.Finally,the advice of incentive competition mechanism,reward incentive competition mechanism,competition restraint mechanism,and logistics guarantee mechanism in colleges was proposed.

关 键 词：高校 委托代理理论 激励竞争机制 

分 类 号：G657[文化科学—教育学]